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THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTION.
THE doctrine of contribution may be defined as. the rule by
which one person, when compelled to discharge more than his
share of any joint liability, can recover from those liable with him
their aliquot proportion of the common burden. The justice of
the rule is obvious, and is recognised by the codes of all civilized
nations.
The instances of its application under our law are
numerous; but all depend on the fundamental principle that
whenever persons are in equali juie a common liability is a common charge. They may, however, for the sake of convenience,
be considered under three heads:I. Contribution, between joint debtors.
II. Contribution 'etween joint owners.
IM. Contribution between owners of contiguous property.
I.

CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT DEBTORS.

The cases under this head may be divided into two classes
A. Co-sureties. - B. Other joint debtors.
A. Contribution between sureties, unlike some other of the
instances of the application of this doctrine, was originally
enforced only by the courts of equity, the chancellors finding its
germ in the Roman law, where, however, it existed in but a crude
and imperfect form. By that law, a surety upon payment of the
debt -became entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of subrogation,.
VoL. XVII,-29
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which, placing him in the position of the creditor, enabled him to
enforce all the remedies of the latter as well against the principal
as the other sureties. A cession of all such remedies would
always be decreed by the court if refused by the creditor, the
transaction being really more the sale than the payment of the
debt. If, however, the surety failed to demand this cession, he
had no remedy against his co-sureties, the theory of the law being
that he obtained contribution, not by reason of any equity between
him and the other sureties, and still less from any idea of an implied contract between them, but that he sued as creditor, to
whose position he was subrogated, and for whom he was procurator in r'em 8uam: Pothier, Obligations, p. ii. c. 6, § 7, Art. 4.
This original harshness of the law was, however, modified to some
extent by the plea or "exeption" of division, introduced by the
Emperor Adrian. The effect of this was that the court would
decree a division of the debt between those sureties who were
short, and thus restrict the demand of the creditor against the
surety sued to his proportion only. If, however, as was the case
with judicial sureties and sureties for debts due the state, this
exception could not, or if in other cases it were not, pleaded, the
surety paying the debt was still entitled to the benefit of the doctrine of subrogation: Pothier, Obligations, p. ii. c. 6, § 6, Art. 12.
The English courts of equity in adopting this remedy, briefly
sketched above, from the Roman law, modified, and enlarged it,
basing it, not upon the narrow ground of subrogation, but upon
the broadest principles of natural equity, that since the payment
of the debt by one surety released all from their liability, the
others ought to reimburse him to the extent of their respective
shares: Deering v. Winchelea, 2 Bos. & Pul. 270. Qui sentire
commodum 8entire debet et onus. The surety was still entitled to
*all collateral securities held by the creditor, but contribution was
decreed entirely independent of the doctrine of subrogation, and
based, as we have said, upon the simplest and broadest principles
of natural equity.
The idea that contribution depends upon the theory of an implied
contract between the sureties has, however, been advocated by some
courts of law, who gradually assumed jurisdiction over the subject.
It would seem, however, to have been thus advocated more to give
jurisdiction and to overcome some technical objections to the form.
of the action, than from any idea that such an implied contract
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actually exists (Barry v. Ransom, 2 Kern. (N. Y.) 467), since
it is not consistent even with the rulings of the courts expressly
advocating it: Bachelder v. Fisk, 17 Mass. 464. Lord ELDON,
in -raythornev. Swinburne, 14 Yes. 160, intimated that since the
rule was so well understood, the sureties might be said to contract
with reference to it; but it seems difficult, even in this modified
form, to reconcile the doctrine with sound reason.
In case the sureties all became bound by the same instrument,
or even by different instruments with the knowledge of one another, it might, perhaps, be said that they contracted with reference to this principle, and that each bound himself on the faith
of the liability of the others. But this surely cannot be said
when the liability of the sureties depends upon different instruments, and they become bound without any common knowledge.;
and yet it is well settled, both at law and in equity, that this is
no bar to obtaining contribution: Deeringv. Winchetsea, 2 Bos. &
P. 270; Cowell v. .Edwards, Id. 268; Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick.
260. And independent of this the object of the contract is
simply to express the relations between the sureties and the creditor ; it is made with him, for his benefit. How then can an
entirely independent contract between the sureties themselves be
implied therefrom? Again, where is the consideration to support
such an implied contract? As we have seen, it cannot be said,
except in a single case, that one surety binds himself, on the
faith of the liability of the others. Neither can it be said that
the law will raise an implied contract to contribute because the
surety who paid the debt did what the others were legally bound
to do, since this can only be applied to cases where one has paid
what was solely the debt of another, and for which he was, as
between themselves, only collaterally liable: Jereys v. Gurr,
2 B. & Ad. 833; Pownall v. Ferrand,6 B. & 0. 439; Davies v.
Hfumphreys, 6 M. & W. 153. Exoneration by the- principal is,
indeed, based upon this doctrine, since here the surety has paid
the debt of the former and not his own; but it cannot be applied
between the sureties themselves, since these all stand in equali
jure, all are equally liable, and the surety asking contribution
has only paid his own debt. To reason as did the court of
Massachusetts (Bachelder v. Fisk, supra), that since the action
is assumpsit the right must rest on an implied contract, is reasoning in a circle, since the idea of an implied contract was first
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advanced expressly to give a basis for this actiou of assunpsit.
This is shown by the very case (Birkley v. Presgrave, 1 East 220)
which the Massachusetts court cites to maintain its position,
where the court decided that, since ubijus ibi remedium, the
action of assumpsit must be adapted to the case by a special
count setting forth the facts.
The history of the adoption of this remedy by the common-law
courts may serve still further to illustrate this point. As has
.been stated, the right was originally enforced only by the courts
of equity, and was only adopted by the common-law courts within
a comparatively recent period. There were indeed the commonlaw writs, de eontributionefaeiendd inter cohceredes, and de feofemente: Fitzherbert, Katura Brevium 162, b.; Harbert's Case, 3
R. 11 b.; but as their titles indicate, they were applicable only
between joint owners of real property. The older reports containmany cases in which contribution between sureties or joint
debtors was denied by the common-law courts: Ofjley & Johnson's
Case, 2 Leond. 166 ; Sir 1in. Whorwood's and Wormleighton and
H~unter's Cases, Godb. 243, and other cases cited in Viner's Abr.
tit. Surety. One of the earliest instances of its recognition by the
law courts is the case of Layer v. Nelson, decided in 1687, and
reported in 1 Vernon 456, but even here it was declared to rest
on a special custom of London, and that it could not be extended
to cases in which the contract was made elsewhere. In 1787, it
was said by BULLER, J., "the first case of the kind in which thc.
plaintiff succeeded was before GOULD, J., at Dorchester:" Touissant v. iartinant,2 T. R. 104.
Aside, therefore, from the fact that the idea that contribution
between sureties depends upon an implied contract seems not to
be founded in good reason, it would seem that the courts of law
thus gradually adopting the remedy from equity, must have based
it upon the same ground as that on which it there rested.
An implied contract may, however, be assumed in order to
support the action at law, but no other consequence should be
deduced from it: -Deeringv. Winchelsea, supra; Barry v. Ransom, supra; and this is practically the view even of those courts
most strenuously advocating the notion of an implied contract,
as in the Massachusetts case before cited (Bachelder v. Fisk. 17
Mass. 464), where the court was in the end, for the sake of con-
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sistency with its own rulings, obliged to fall back on the maxim
ubijus ibi remedium.
Although the action may be thus maintained at law, equity
is still the usual and better tribunal, Lord ELUOtN regretting
that, owing to the necessary incompleteness of the remedy
in the law courts, they ever assumed jurisdiction: Gowell v.
Edwards, supra. Thus where one surety dies, contribution
against his representatives cannot be obtained at law. The
contract of the surety with the creditor is a personal one,
and his death must necessarily terminate his liability; and
it cannot be said, therefore, that the subsequent payment of
the debt by another surety enured to the benefit of his estate:
Waters v. Ri/ey, 2 Har. & G. 805; York v. Peck, 14 Barb. 644.
Equity, however, disregarding these technical objections, on.
account of the manifest hardship of the case, will decree contribution against the representatives of a deceased surety: Simpson
v. Vaughn, 2 Atk. 83; Primrose v. Bromley, 1 Atk. 89. The
rule in equity has also been held to be the rule of law by the"
courts of some states, which have no equity tribunals, on account
of the necessity of the case: Bachelder v. Fisk, supra; Riddle
v. Bowman, 7 Foster 236.
So in the case of the insolvency of one surety, complete relief
cannot be obtained at law, since the remedy being several against;
each. surety, the insolvent's share cannot be apportioned: Brownw
v. Lee, 6 B. & 0. 689; Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick. 260. This
difficulty not existing in equity, the insolvent's share will be there
apportioned among all the other sureties: Peters v. Bich, 1 Oh.
R. 84; Holt v. Harrison, Id. 240: The court of New Hampshire adopted this as the rule of law, on the same ground of
necessity as in the case of a deceased surety: Henderson v.
ileDuffi e, 5 N. H. 88.
This right of contribution not arising in favor of any surety
till he has paid more than his share of the debt, is not barred by
the discharge of any other by a certificate in bankruptcy. If
the payment of the debt be made subsequently, the bankrupt'sshare is the same as any other debt contracted after his discharge;
if made before it is provable against his estate, like any other
debt. This is the rule under both the English and American
acts: Collins v. Prosser, 1 B. & 0. 682; White v. Corbett, 1 E.
B. & E. 1103; -Dole v. Warren, 32 Me. 94; Dunn v. Spark, I
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Carter 397; Hilliard on Bankruptcy, p. 323; James on Bankrupt
Law of 1867, p. 142.
The payment of the debt upon which this claim for contribution is founded must have been made compulsorily. This does
not mean, however, that it is necessary for the surety in all cases
to delay until the creditor sues and obtains judgment against
him; it is sufficient that upon default of the principal the creditor
demand the debt of him, and he may thereupon pay and recover
contribution from his co-sureties: Cowell v. -Edwards, 2 Bos. &
Pull. 268; Bradley v. Burwell, 3 Denio 61. This, indeed, would
be his only proper course, for if he compelled the creditor to sue,
the costs of the suit would fall solely upon himself, he having no
right to demand contribution for an expense incurred in thus
uselessly resisting a legal demand: JNnight v. .ughes, 3 Car. &
P. 467; Henry v. Goldney, 15 M. &W. 494. If, however, there
be any valid defence, it would be the duty of the surety upon
whom the demand is made to plead it, in all cases in which it
would be hopeful and prudent for him to do so; and in the event
of such defence proving unsuccessful, he could recover from his
co-sureties their proportion of the costs, they being incurred for the
common benefit: Kemp v. Pinden, 12 M. & W. 421; Pletcher v.
Jackson, 23 Vt. 593; -Davis v. Bmerson, 17 Me. 64. And,
indeed, not to plead such defence would bar his claim to contribution, since the payment would then be regarded as having been
made voluntarily.
With this exception it may be generally stated that contribution
cannot be extended beyond the liability assumed by the sureties
when making the contract with the creditor. Thus there can be
no recovery of interest, since the right to compel contribution
arising immediately upon payment of the debt by any suretyj if
he delay making the claim, he suffers for his own neglect: Bell
v. -ree, 1 Swanst. 90; Bezoil v. Bowerbank, 1 Campb. 50. The
application of this rule must, however, be confined to the reasons
upon which it is based. Thus if the remedy of the surety is, by
reason of his co-surety's insolvency, practically worthless, there
is authority for the statement that he may, when the latter becomes again solvent, recover from him his share of the debt with
interest from the time of payment: Swain v. Wall, 1 Ch. R. 149.
This right of contribution affects only the relations of the sureties between themselves, and is entirely distinct from and inde-
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pendent of the contract with the creditor, and cannot be modified
by any act of his. Thus a surety, though discharged by the
creditor, is still liable for his share of the debt in respect to
contribution: BEz parte Gifford, 6 Yesey 805; Story's Eq.,
§ 498 and note. The sureties may, however, between themselves,
make any contract they please, and one surety may thus be"
exempted from all liability to contribute: Swan v. Wall, 8upra;
Craythorne v. Swinburne, 14 Vesey 160; Barry v. Ransom, 2
Kern. 467. Such agreement may be either express or implied.
Thus, if one surety enter into the original contract at the request
of the others, there might as to him be an implied waiver of the
right to contribution, and if compelled to pay the debt, he could
recover the whole amount from his co-sureties. Parol evidence,
as well.of an. express agreement as of such extrinsic circumstances, is admissible, it not being offered to vary the terms of a
written contract, the object of that being simply to express their
relations with the. creditor: Craythorne v. Swinburne, sura,
Bradley v. .ansom, supra, overruling GREY, J., in NYorton v.
Coons, 2 Selden 38.
If the surety. paying the debt release any of his co-sureties, he
could still compel the others to contribute their proportion, their
liability to him being several and not joint: Graham v. _Robinson,
2 T. R. 282; 23 Yt. 581.
The foregoing re-marks, though, made more especially with
reference to sureties for the debt of another, apply to all contracts
of indemnity. Thus in the case of double insurance, in the
absence of the usual clause in the policy regulating this, any one
set of underwriters compelled to pay the whole loss would have
contribution against the others: Newby v. Reed, 1 W. 1. 416.
B. Otler Joint JDebtors.-The principles already discussed with
reference to co-sureties apply equally to joint debtors generally,
this distinction having been made only for convenience. In the
Roman law, however, there was a distinction in some respects between the two clqsses. Thus only sureties could plead the exception of division: Pothier Oblig., p. II. c. 6, § 6, Art. 2. Again,
while the doctrine of subrogation applied equally to both, joint
debtors, unlike sureties, could obtain contribution without subrogation, by means of the actio pro socio : Pothier Oblig., p. II., c.
3, Art. 8, §§ 5 and 6.
Contribution between Wrongdoers.-This is the only exception
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to the general rule that contribution will always be decreed whenever one person pays more than his share of any joint liability,
both law and equity denying relief to one whose claim must be
based on his own -wrong: ferryweather v. Nixon, 8 T. R. 186
(Smith's L. C.). This must, however, be confined to the reasons
upon which it is based, and can therefore only be applied to cases
of actual moral wrong, or where the act was wilfully committed
and known to be illegal: Wooley v. Batte, 2 Car. & P. 417;
Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66; Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn.
455; Horbach v. Bider, 18 Penna. 33. Ignorantia juris non
excusat, but here the plaintiff does not seek to escape from his
liability, but only asks that those equally responsible with him
for the injury should bear their proportion of the penalty. Where
the tort was committed by the servant of several persons, while
employed in the common service, and one master is sued, it is
clear that the reason of the rule denying contribution between
wrongdoers does not apply: -Worley v. Balte, supra; . orbach v.
.Elder,3upra.
I.

CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN JOINT OWNERS.

A. Between Joint Owners of (hattes.-One joint owner of a
chattel cannot, as a general rule, compel the others to contribute
towards expenses incurred by him in making repairs or improvements on the common property, unless made frith the consent of
such other owners. This consent, however, need not be express,
but may be implied from circumstances; as in the case of animals,
the owners of which may always be presumed, unless there be
special circumstances, to desire that they should be fed and sheltered; the owner may also in many other cases be regarded as
agent for all: Story on Part. § 414; Steamboat New Orleans v.
PhceTu, 11 Peters 175. The subject is usually discussed with
reference to part owners of. ships, and many questions of interest
are involved not strictly falling within the limits of this article.
B. Contribution between Joint Owners of Beal Estate.-Contribution between joint owners of real estate, while based upon
the same equitable principles as in the cases already considered,
is not so exclusively a creature of chancery, the common law providing the means for its enforcement. CoQtribution may be
enforced by one joint owner of real estate against another in tw6
cases.
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(1). For expenses incurred in making repairson a louse.-In
regard to repairs or improvements made by one joint owner of
real estate, the general rule is the same as in the law of personal
property: Bowles's Case, 11 R. 82 b; Taylor v, Baldwin, 10
Barb. 582. An exception was, however, made by the common
law in favor of joint owners of houses and mills; one tenant, in
case his co-tenant refused to join him in making necessary repairs,
being enabled to compel him so to do by means of the writ de
reparationefaciend6: Fitzherbert's Natura Brevium 162 b ;-Co.
Litt. 200 b. This writ was, according to Lord CoKE, based upon
reasons of public policy, the owners being "bound, pro, bono
publico, to maintain houses and mills which are for the habitation
and use of man :" Ibid.; and it isupon this ground, and because
such property cannot be conveniently partitioned, that the action
now rests: Doane v. Badger, 12 Mass. 65; Alumford v. Brown,
6 Cowen 475. The expenses of all other improvements upon
land held jointly must be borne solely by the person making
them, the improvements themselves enuring to the benefit of the
estate. A court of equity will, however, when decreeing partition,
assign to the tenant who made the improvements that part of the
estate upon which they were made, or make some other equitable
arrangement: Town v. Needham, 3 Paige 546; Green v. Putnam,
1 Barb. 507.
(2). Contribution to redeem an estate from a mortgage or other
lien.-At the common law, the writs de contributionewould always
lie where lands held jointly were charged with a suit which the lorAI
sought to enforce agiinst one tenant solely. These writs were
founded on the Statute of Marlebridge, 52 H. 3, c. 9, which provided, " if any inheritance, whereof but one suit is due, descends
unto many heirs as with parceners, whoso hath the eldest part of
the inheritance shall do the suit for herself and fellows, and the
others shall be contributaries according to their portions." With
respect to feoffees, there could not, from the nature of. the case,
be any statutory provision as to who should do the suit, and it
was therefore left to the agreement of the parties; if they could
not agiee, the lord could sue any one, who could compel the others
to come in and defend with him by means 6f an audita querela:
Fitzherbert's N. B. 162 b.; Harbert'sCase, 3 R. 11 b. These writs
were.commonly used when lands were charged with the payment
of an ancestor's or grantor's debt by recognisance or statutes
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merchant, and many instances of this application are given in
ifarbert's Case, 3 R. 11 b. This case declared what may be
regarded as the fundamental principle of contribution, that whenever persons stand in equalijure,they must bear rateably all burdens. Another principle equally fundamental is that in the case
of a mortgage the debt is the principal, and the land only collateral security for its payment. On these two principles depends
the modern law of contribution to redeem a mortgage. It may,
perhaps, be more conveniently discussed under two divisions.
(a). With reference to grantees.
b). .With reference to heirs or devisees.
'(a). If the mortgagor alien his whole estate to different purchasers by deeds taking efect simultaneously, the purchasers
would then all stand in equalijure,and would contribute rateably
towards the redemption. If, however, the mortgagor alien only
part of his estate, the portion retained. by him is primarily liable,
the debt being the principal. If, now, he grant this remainder
of the estate to a second purchaser, the portion thus subsequently
granted would still be primarily liable, as such second grantee
would take the estate as his grantor had it, or, to state the rule
in its usual form, "the lands are charged in the inverse order of
alienation." This rule, the justice of which was ably vindicated
by Chancellor KENT (Cheeseborough v. Hillard,1 Johns. Oh. 409),
may now be regarded as settled law in most of the states.' The
only question is, do the parties stand in equali jure P Clearly
they do not. The first purchaser buys, as he supposes, an unencumbered estate. The second stands in the position of his
grantor, and can no more compel the first to contribute than
could the grantor himself.
. (b). The case of heirs or devisees presents no difficulty. All
stand in equalijure,and any one compelled to pay the whole debt
in order to save his estate, is subrogated to the position of the
mortgagee, and holds the mortgage as. equitable assignee till the
others redeem by contributing their proportions.
A tenant for life is bound to assume only those burdens which
enure to the benefit of his estate. Thus, he must pay taxes, they
I See

Cowden's Estate, I Penna. St. 267, where the subject is discussed by KeiJ., and the authorities cited by Story's Eq., 1233 ;, in opposition to the
rule are shown to have no application, with perhaps an exception: 1 Younge &
Colyer Ch. 401.
NEDY,
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being imposed for yearly benefits; but he can obtain contribution
from the reversioner for assessments imposed for permanent improvements: Cairn v. Cl7aubert, 8 Edw. Ch. 812. He is therefore obliged to pay only the interest of encumbrances while his
estate lasts, and contribution between him and the reversioner on
redemption is based upon this principle. The old rule was that
he should pay one-third of the debt (Rulu v. Flud, Freeman
210), but the more exact modern rule is that he pays "1what the
present worth of annuity equal to the interest would amount to
computed for as many years as he has chances of life, as given
by the annuity tables :" 1 Washburn Real Prop., p. 917. A
dowress of course pays an amount equal to one-third of the interest, ascertained by the same rule.
As between an heir and a devisee, the lands not disposed of by
will are primarily liable, "the heir sitting in the seat of his
ancestor :" Grahamv. Dickinson, 3 Barb. Ch. 169.
III.

CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN OWNERS OF CONTIGUOUS
PROPERTY.

Contribution may in some cases be enforced between owners of
contiguous property, or of personal property subjected to a common risk, when an act is done by one for the common benefit.
The only instance of this in the law of personal property is the
rule known as
A. 'eneral Average.-When property on the sea is in danger
of destruction in consequence of some marine peril, and a sacrifice
of some part of such property is voluntarily made for the purpose
of saving the remainder, the property thus saved contributes by
this rule its proportion of the loss sustained by the owner of that
sacrificed. The justice of this rule is obvious, and its "wisdom
and equity will do honor to the state from which it has been derived as long as maritime commerce shall endure:" Abbott on
Shipping, p. 605. Its origin was the ancient law of Rhodes, and
from thence it was adopted into the Roman law. One of the earliest reported cases in the English law is that of Hicks v. Palington, F. Moore 297 (22 Eliz.), where it is stated as a rule of the
civil law. It was, however, recognised long anterior to this, as
shown by the message sent by Edward I., A. D. .1285, to the
Cinque Ports: Rymer Fcedera, p. ii. p. 654.
There are three essentials to bring a loss within this rule: It
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must have been voluntary, necessary, and successful. Anciently,
when a jettison of goods was made, it was usual for the master to
consult with his crew as to its propriety, but this rule is abrogated
by modem law. It was never considered absolutely essential
to the bringing of a loss within the rule, but was merely considered as furnishing good evidence of its necessity: Abbott on
Shipping, p. 471. In cases of extreme danger, there being no
time for such consultation, the imminency of the peril would justify an "irregular" jettison: Ibid.
All property saved, whether ship, cargo, or freight, contributes
towards the average; and, if either be sacrificed, the loss constitutes a claim for contribution. By the Rhodian law, even the
effects and clothes of those on board contributed, nothing being
excepted save provisions and instruments for the defence of the
ship (3 Kent Com. p. 240); and such was also the rule of the old
English law.1
In estimating -the value upon which this contribution is to be
based, the ship's value at the time she was lost is estimated by
the aid of the best avdilable evidence (Simonds v. White, 2 B. &
C. 805), although various rules for approximation have been proposed: 1 Caines 573; 2 S. & R. 229. The cargo is valued at
the net price it would have yielded at the port of discharge:
Rogers v. Mech. Ins. Co., 1 Story 609. The valueof the ship's
equipments is considered as being two-thirds of their original
value: &rony v. N. Y. FireIs. Co., 11 Johns. 328.
It would seem that expenses incurred in .seeking repairs
should fall within the rule, they being for the benefit of cargo
and ship: Padefordr. Boardman, 4 Mass. 548; G'eely v. Tremont Ins. Co., 9 Cush. 421.
B. Cortributimsbetween Owners of ontiww Real Ztate.At the -common law, there was the writ de dmo reparanda,by
which a tenant of one part of a house to compel a tenant of
another part to repair that part in which he lived. Thus, the
tennt of the lower part.could compel the tenant of the upper to
repair the roof. Several instances of its application are reported,
although its exact extent is not well settled: Fitiherbert, N. B.
ISee cases cited in Vkm. Abr., it. Coufatiim and Awra eb. The message
of Edward L, cited above, enumerates the Iblowing among the articles liable to
contribute: "Monile, zona et ciphus argenteus, et anulus magistri navls, in digito
SUO portatn."

THE LAW OF CONTRIBUTION.

127 ; Keilway 98; 11 Mod. 7; Tenant. v. Goldwin, 2 Ld.
Raymond 1089. It was said by PARsoNs, C. J., that it would
still lie, but this appears doubtful: Loring v. Bacon, 4 Mass. 575;
Clheeseborough v. Greene, 10 Conn. 818. It was not, however, a
writ of contribution, the expense of the repairs falling solely on
the defendant. Equity will now, however, consider all such expenses as a common charge, since both tenants share in the benefit:
Campbell v. Mesier, 4 Johns. Oh. 884; 10 Conn. 818. The subject is, however, usually regulated by statute.
Party-walls.-Whenever a party-wall is in need of repairs,
and one owner refuses to join the other in making them, equity
will, in the absence of any statutory regulation, compel the former
to contribute his share of the expense. This was the rule of the
civil law (Domat, Civil Law, B. I., tit. 12, § 4), and is well established as the rule in equity: Campbell v. HMeier, 4 Johns. Ch.
334; Partridge v. Gilbert, 15 *N. Y. 601; ,Serrerdv. Ciseco, 4
Sandf. (N. Y. Superior Ct.) 480. Chancellor KENT extended the
rule to a case where the wall being in a ruinous condition, was
torn down and rebuilt (Partridge v. Gilbert, 8upra); but the
validity of this application has been doubted in 15 N. Y. 601,
and 4 Sandf. 480. These cases differed somewhat from Campbell
v. Mesier, and cannoi be regarded as overruling it. In these
cases the buildings were destroyed by fire, and the easement in
the wall was of course extinguished by its destruction. And
since one owner could not compel the other to rebuild, the reciprocity of obligation, which is the necessary basis of a claim for
contribution, no longer existed. Where, however, as in Campbell
v. Aesier, in repairing a wall it is found to be so ruinous that
it is'necessary to tear it down and rebuild, the case only differs
from ordinary repairs in the fact of their being more extensive.
Division fenes.This case is usually regulated by statute, but
aside from this, equity would always decree contribution, whenever the erection of such fences could be regarded as a benefit to
both estates. Thus,. it is an equal benefit to a railroad company,
and to the owner of the contiguous land, that the cattle of the
latter should not stray upon the road. In the absence, therefore, of statutory regulations, equity would consider the expense
of building a division fence between the road and the contiguous
land as constituting a common charge: In the Matter of the Bens.
and"SaratogaRailroad,4 Paige 556.
H. K. C.

